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ABSTRACT
Any engineering approach to cybersecurity must recognize that many
breaches are the result of human behavior, rather than sophisticated malware.
Effective cybersecurity defenses require a systematic engineering approach that
recognizes the organizational, cultural and psychological barriers to effectively
dealing with this problem. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
defines “phishing” as, “the use of fraudulent emails and copy-cat websites to
trick you into revealing valuable personal information—such as account
numbers for banking, securities, mortgage, or credit accounts, your social
security numbers, and the login IDs and passwords you use when accessing
online financial service providers.” Once this information is fraudulently
obtained, it may be used to steal your identity, money, or both.
A review of the literature reveals an alarming lack of attention to the
prevalent threat of low-technology, or low-complexity phishing attacks.
Accordingly, here is a primer on the prominent exploit known as phishing,
illustration of several cases, and the necessity for organizational and societal
education of data users as to appropriate computer hygiene. Much of the
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literature about cyberattack addresses technical aspects of computer code,
encryption, and bad actor attribution. Yet human behavior remains a significant
source responsible for successful cyber intrusions. Your authors believe this
Article provides a valuable discussion about the human factors that very often
comprise a back-door entryway into data systems.
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OVERVIEW
Any engineering approach to cybersecurity must recognize that many
breaches are the result of human behavior rather than sophisticated malware.
Effective cybersecurity defenses require a systematic engineering approach that
recognizes the organizational, cultural and psychological barriers to effectively
dealing with this problem. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC) defines “phishing” as, “the use of fraudulent emails and copy-cat websites
to trick you into revealing valuable personal information—such as account
numbers for banking, securities, mortgage, or credit accounts, your social
security numbers, and the login IDs and passwords you use when accessing
online financial service providers.” 1 Once this information is fraudulently
obtained, it may be used to steal your identity, money, or both. 2
A review of the literature reveals an alarming lack of attention to the
prevalent threat of low-technology, or low-complexity, phishing attacks.
Accordingly, here is a primer on the prominent exploit known as phishing,
illustration of several cases, and the necessity for organizational and societal
education of data users as to appropriate computer hygiene.
This Article proceeds as follows: First, we describe the escalating global
cyber threat environment, and examine the high costs of data breaches. Second,
we examine privacy issues. Third, we present an overview of the phishing
exploit. Fourth, we discuss corporate responsibility for corrective action. Fifth,
we provide a few thoughts about defensive tactics available to protect against
phishing attacks. And last, we conclude. Much of the literature about cyberattack
addresses technical aspects of computer code, encryption, and bad actor
attribution. Yet human behavior remains a significant source responsible for
successful cyber intrusions. Your authors believe this Article provides a valuable
discussion about the human factors that very often comprise a back-door
entryway into data systems.
I.

ESCALATING GLOBAL CYBER THREAT ENVIRONMENT

Like their expanding user base, the data collected on Facebook
users has also skyrocketed. They have moved on from schools, likes,
and relationship status. Today, Facebook has access to dozens of data
points, ranging from ads you’ve clicked on, events you’ve attended,
and your location based on your mobile device.
1
“Phishing” Fraud: How to Avoid Getting Fried by Phony Phishermen, SEC (Sept. 5, 2013),
https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investor-publications/investorpubsphishinghtm.html.
2
Id.
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It is no secret that Facebook makes money off this data through
advertising revenue, although many seem confused by, or altogether
unaware, of this fact. Facebook generated $40 billion in revenue in
2017, with about 98 percent coming from advertising across Facebook
and Instagram.
—Senator Chuck Grassley
Chairman, Senate Judiciary Committee
April 10, 2018 3

Cyber breaches and theft continue to grow at an alarming rate, 4 constituting
a threat to business 5 and global stability and peace. 6 For perspective, during the
most recent decade alone, RiskBased Security reports, “there were 986 reported
breaches exposing 102,646,498 records in 2010. It only took two years to more
than double the number of breaches—2012 jumped up to 3,335 reported
breaches—and by 2016 the number of records exposed was consistently over
the 5 billion mark.” 7 RiskBased Security warns, “Looking ahead, we see little
indication of improvement. In fact, it’s quite the opposite. Low complexity
phishing attacks show no sign of slowing, malware is as virulent as ever, and the
black market for stolen data continues to thrive.” 8 Recent key highlights for data
breaches are depicted in Exhibit 1.

3
See Facebook, Social Media Privacy, and the Use and Abuse of Data: Hearing Before the S. Judiciary
Comm. & the S. Com. Comm., 115th Cong. 1–2 (2018) (statement of Sen. Chuck Grassley, Chairman, S. Comm.
on the Judiciary). See also Lawrence J. Trautman, Governance of the Facebook Privacy Crisis, 20 PITT. J. TECH.
& POL’Y 41, 41–147 (2020).
4
See Lawrence J. Trautman , How Law Operates in a Wired Global Society: Cyber and E-Commerce
Risk, PROCEEDS OF THE KOREA LEGISLATION RESEARCH INSTITUTE (KLRI), 2017 LEGAL SCHOLAR
ROUNDTABLE, Seoul, Korea, 21–22 Sept., 2017.
5
See Lawrence J. Trautman & George P. Michaely, Jr., The SEC and the Internet: Regulating the Web
of Deceit, 68 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 262 (2014); Lawrence J. Trautman, Congressional Cybersecurity
Oversight: Who’s Who and How It Works, 5 J.L. & CYBER WARFARE 147 (2016).
6
See Scott J. Shackelford, The Law of Cyber Peace, 18 CHI. J. INT’L L. 1 (2017); Scott J. Shackelford,
Timothy L. Fort & Jamie D. Prenkert, How Businesses Can Promote Cyber Peace, 36 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 353
(2014); Scott J. Shackelford, In Search of Cyber Peace: A Response to the Cybersecurity Act of 2012, 64 STAN.
L. REV. ONLINE 106 (2012).
7
2019 Year End Data Breach QuickView Report, RISK BASED SECURITY 1, 22 (2020),
https://pages.riskbasedsecurity.com/hubfs/Reports/2019/2019%20Year%20End%20Data%20Breach%20Quic
kView%20Report.pdf.
8
Id.
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Exhibit 1
Data Breach Key Highlights 9
•
•
•

•

•

In 2019, there were 7,098 breaches reported, exposing over
15.1 billion records.
The number of records exposed is [up] 284% compared to
2018, [up] 91% compared to 2017.
Although the number of breaches in 2019 is only 1% higher
compared to 2018, it is anticipated the gap will continue to
grow throughout Q1 2020 as more 2019 incidents come to
light.
Web (inadvertent exposure of data online) compromised 13.5
billion records while hacking exposed 1.5 billion records. All
other data types combined exposed approximately 120 million
records.
Breaches at technology providers pushed the Information
sector to the top spot for number of breaches, followed by the
Healthcare sector. . . . 10

For additional perspective, RiskBased Security documents, “the number of
breaches disclosed in 2019 once again hit an all-time high . . . . [while] the 2019
incident reports were still trickling in [when] this report was created. . . . Looking
back at the patterns from the prior three years, we anticipate another 250–300
incidents will be added to 2019.” 11 Exhibit 2 depicts the number of annual
breaches reported.
Exhibit 2
Number of Breaches Reported Each Year 12

9
10
11
12

Id. at 4.
Id.
Id. at 10 (alteration in original).
Id.
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Inga Goddijn, Executive Vice President at RiskBased Security, cautions, “as
we look over the experience of 2019 what stands out is that we are often our own
worst enemy.” 13 Weak controls and human nature appear responsible for the
severity and number of 2019 breaches, “whether it’s a phishing campaign that
ultimately provides malicious actors with a toehold into systems or
misconfigured databases and services that leave millions of sensitive records
freely available on the internet . . . .” 14 Growing interest in user credentials is
observed during 2019 as “Troves of username and password combinations
continue to become available on forums and file sharing sites while phishing for
access credentials—a perennially popular method for gaining access to systems
and services—has surged in recent months, proving . . . social engineering
techniques still produce results for attackers.” 15 RiskBased Security reports:
The breach at Bodybuilding.com is a prime example of this trend.
In July [2018], malicious actors gained access to the company’s
systems thanks to a successful phishing email. Hackers were able to
move about the system for approximately eight months, potentially
accessing data ranging from customer names and addresses to profile
details and order history.
Incidents like the breach at Bodybuilding.com also explain why
the Miscellaneous data type is growing. Should something like order
history and customer’s interests be captured in the profile of a breach
event? We think so. While not as sensitive as banking details or Social
Security numbers, the data can be especially useful for creating
targeted phishing campaigns—so much so that organizations are
beginning to warn users of the risk. Bodybuilding.com did exactly this,
stating in their FAQ’s to customers, Please note that the email from
Bodybuilding.com does not ask you to click on any links or contain
attachments and does not request your personal data. If the email you
received about this issue prompts you to click on a link, suggests you
download an attachment, or asks you for information, the email was
not sent by Bodybuilding.com and may be an attempt to steal your
personal data. 16

For perspective, Exhibit 3 provides information about the top 10 data
breaches of all time.
13
Data Breach QuickView Report 2019 Q3 Trends, RISK BASED SECURITY 1, 17 (2019), https://pages.
riskbasedsecurity.com/hubfs/Reports/2019/Data%20Breach%20QuickView%20Report%202019%20Q3%20T
rends.pdf.
14
Id.
15
Cyber Risk Analytics 2019 MidYear QuickView Data Breach Report, RISK BASED SECURITY 1, 4
(2019), https://pages.riskbasedsecurity.com/hubfs/Reports/2019/2019%20MidYear%20Data%20Breach%20
QuickView%20Report.pdf.
16
Id.
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Exhibit 3
Top 10 Breaches of All Time 17
1.

YAHOO. Reported breach of 3 billion records on December 14,
2016. 18

2.

FIRST AMERICAN FINANCIAL CORPORATION. Breach of
approximately 885,000,000 real estate closing transaction records
containing names, Social Security numbers, phone numbers, email and
physical addresses, driver’s license images, banking details, and
mortgage lender names and loan numbers exposed on the Internet due
to IDOR flaw. 19

3.

FACEBOOK. Records about 540 million Facebook users were
exposed publicly on Amazon’s cloud computing service. 20

4.

YAHOO. 2014 Breach involving 500 million records: usernames;
email addresses; phone numbers; dates of birth; hashed passwords and
security questions and associated answers, not reported until 2016. 21

5.

MARIOTT/STARWOOD HOTELS. Personal information was
breached including travel schedules and passport numbers of 500
million persons. 22

6.

FRIEND FINDER NETWORKS. The breach impacted 412 million
people (over 15 million deleted accounts) that had not been deleted. 23

7.

MYSPACE. Affecting 360 million people, this substantially
abandoned social network only discovered this breach when these data
surfaced for sale during 2016. 24

17
Top 10 Worst Data Breaches of All Time, PURDUE UNIV. GLOB. (Oct. 4, 2019), https://www.
purdueglobal.edu/blog/information-technology/worst-data-breaches-infographic/.
18
Id.
19
Id.; Dell Cameron, 855 Million Records Exposed Online: Bank Transactions, Social Security Numbers,
and More, GIZMODO (May 24, 2019, 5:35 PM), https://gizmodo.com/885-million-sensitive-records-leakedonline-bank-trans-1835016235.
20
Top 10 Worst Data Breaches of All Time, supra note 17.
21
Id.; Nicole Perlroth, Yahoo Says Hackers Stole Data on 500 Million Users in 2014, N.Y. TIMES
(Sept. 22, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/23/technology/yahoo-hackers.html.
22
Top 10 Worst Data Breaches of All Time, supra note 17.
23
Id.
24
Top 10 Worst Data Breaches of All Time, supra note 17.
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8.

EQUIFAX. During 2017, 143 million people were impacted by
exposure of their personal information, including: credit card numbers
and credit dispute documents. 25

9.

CAPITAL ONE. During 2019, information including names,
addresses, phone numbers, credit scores and payment histories for the
period 2005–2019 were exposed. 26

10. HEARTLAND PAYMENT SYSTEMS. Impacting approximately
100 million persons, their information including magnetic strip data
(allowing for credit card creation) went undetected for 8 months. 27
A. Data Breach Costs
Based on interviews of more than 500 global companies having experienced
a data breach between July 2018 and April 2019, the Ponemon Institute and IBM
Security depict the average cost of a data breach for these companies at: $3.92
million; a cost per record of $150; average size of a data breach at 25,575
records; and average time to identify and contain a breach at 279 days. 28 An
interesting aspect of data breaches is that costs of mitigation often extend over
several years. The IBM/Ponemon study reveals, “[a]bout one-third of data
breach costs occurred more than one year after a data breach incident in the 86
companies [studied] . . . . an average of 67 percent of breach costs came in the
first year, 22 percent accrued in the second . . . and 11 percent . . . more than two
years after . . . .” 29 In addition, “[t]he loss of customer trust had serious financial
consequences for the companies studied.” 30 The IBM / Ponemon study warns:
While malicious breaches were most common, inadvertent breaches
from human error and system glitches were still the root cause for
nearly half (49 percent) of the data breaches studied in the report.
Human error as a root cause of a breach includes “inadvertent insiders”
who may be compromised by phishing attacks or have their devices
infected or lost/stolen. These were responsible for about one-quarter
of breaches. System glitches, or inadvertent failures that could not be
tied to a human action, accounted for another quarter of breaches.
While less expensive than malicious attacks, system glitches and
25

Id.
Id.
27
Id.
28
See PONEMON INSTITUTE & IBM SECURITY, COST OF DATA BREACH REPORT 3 (2019), https://www.
ibm.com/security/data-breach.
29
Id. at 5 (alteration in original).
30
Id.
26
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human error breaches are still costly, with an average loss of $3.24
million and $3.5 million respectively. 31

Another finding, of particular concern to entrepreneurs, is that “small
businesses face disproportionately larger costs relative to larger
organizations.” 32 The Ponemon Institute and IBM Security study reports, “[t]he
total cost for the largest organizations (more than 25,000 employees) averaged
$5.11 million, which is $204 per employee. Smaller organizations with between
500 and 1,000 employees had an average cost of $2.65 million, or $3,533 per
employee.” 33 Therefore, underfunded smaller organizations may encounter
costs from breaches that threaten their very survival. Now, we will look at
phishing: what it is; and examine several examples of this gateway to cyber theft.
B. Social Engineering Attack
The U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team, an organization within the
Department of Homeland Security’s Cyber Security and Infrastructure Security
Agency, in defining a social engineering attack, states, “an attacker uses human
interaction (social skills) to obtain or compromise information about an
organization or its computer systems. An attacker may seem unassuming and
respectable, possibly claiming to be a new employee, repair person, or researcher
and even offering credentials to support that identity.” 34 DHS warns, “by asking
questions, he or she may be able to piece together enough information to
infiltrate an organization’s network . . . gather enough information from one
source . . . contact another source within the same organization and rely on the
information from the first source to add to his or her credibility.” 35

Id. at 7.
Id.
33
Id.
34
Avoiding Social Engineering and Phishing Attacks, Security Tip (ST04-014), CYBERSECURITY &
INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. AGENCY (Nov. 15, 2019), https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/tips/ST04-014.
35
Id.
31
32

TRAUTMANETAL_4.13.21

48

4/15/2021 11:09 AM

EMORY CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY REVIEW [Vol. 8

II. GROWING CYBER PRIVACY RISK FACTORS
Something is awry. It is true that many capitalists, including
surveillance capitalists, vigorously employ these century-old
justifications for their freedom when they reject regulatory, legislative,
judicial, societal, or any other form of public interference in their
methods of operation.
—Soshana Zuboff
The Charles Edward Wilson Professor emerita,
Harvard Business School, 2019 36

A. Security Breaches, Hacking and Phishing Attacks
Of particular relevance to our inquiry into privacy issues and Russia
meddling into the 2016 and 2018 U.S. elections, Facebook warns, “Security
breaches and improper access to or disclosure of our data or users data, or other
hacking and phishing attacks on our systems, could harm our reputation and
adversely affect our business.” 37
Accordingly:
Our industry is prone to cyber-attacks by third parties seeking
unauthorized access to our data or users’ data or to disrupt our ability
to provide service. Any failure to prevent or mitigate security breaches
and improper access to or disclosure of our data or user data, including
personal information, content or payment information from users,
could result in the loss or misuse of such data, which could harm our
business and reputation and diminish our competitive position. In
addition, computer malware, viruses, social engineering
(predominantly spear phishing attacks), and general hacking have
become more prevalent in our industry, have occurred on our systems
in the past, and will occur on our systems in the future. We also
regularly encounter attempts to create false or undesirable user
accounts, purchase ads, or take other actions on our platform for
purposes such as spamming, spreading misinformation, or other
objectionable ends. As a result of our prominence, the size of our user
SHOSHANA ZUBOFF, THE AGE OF SURVEILLANCE CAPITALISM: THE FIGHT FOR A HUMAN FUTURE AT
(2019).
37
Complaint at 7, Yuan v. Facebook, No. 3:18-cv-01725 (N.D. Cal. filed March 20, 2018). See also
Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod, WannaCry, Ransomware, and the Emerging Threat to Corporations,
86 TENN. L. REV. 503 (2019); Lawrence J. Trautman & Peter C. Ormerod, Industrial Cyber Vulnerabilities:
Lessons from Stuxnet and the Internet of Things, 72 U. MIAMI L. REV. 761 (2018); Lawrence J. Trautman, Is
Cyberattack the Next Pearl Harbor?, 18 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 233 (2016); Lawrence J. Trautman, Cybersecurity:
What About U.S. Policy?, 2015 J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 341 (2015); David D. Schein & Lawrence J. Trautman, The
Dark Web and Employer Liability, 18 COLO. TECH. L.J. 49 (2020).
36
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base, and the types and volume of personal data on our systems, we
believe that we are a particularly attractive target for such breaches and
attacks. Such attacks may cause interruptions to the services we
provide, degrade the user experience, cause users to lose confidence
and trust in our products, impair our internal systems, or result in
financial harm to us. . . . Cyber-attacks continue to evolve in
sophistication and volume, and inherently may be difficult to detect
for long periods of time. Although we have developed systems and
processes that are designed to protect our data and user data, to prevent
data loss, to disable undesirable accounts and activities on our
platform, and to prevent or detect security breaches, we cannot assure
you that such measures will provide absolute security, and we may
incur significant costs in protecting against or remediating cyberattacks.
In addition, some of our developers or other partners, such as those
that help us measure the effectiveness of ads, may receive or store
information provided by us or by our users through mobile or web
applications integrated with Facebook. . . .
Affected users or government authorities could initiate legal or
regulatory actions against us in connection with any security breaches
or improper disclosure of data, which could cause us to incur
significant expense and liability or result in orders or consent decrees
forcing us to modify our business practices. Such incidents may also
result in a decline in our active user base or engagement levels. Any
of these events could have a material and adverse effect on our
business, reputation, or financial results. 38

B. Growth of Transnational Criminal Actors and Phishing
Transnational organized crime during recent years, “has added new lines of
business, including industrial espionage and cyber theft to their long-standing
lines of business staples such as blackmail, the drug trade, and prostitution.” 39
Much of the growth in transnational organized crime during recent years has
been attributed by former BBC journalist Misha Glenny, “to the downfall of the
Soviet Union, which resulted in thousands of former KGB and Eastern European
intelligence officers seeking new employment in rather unsavory occupations,
primarily in the highly profitable illicit drug trade.”40 Consider the impact on
political stability resulting from breaches of secrecy (think Snowden, 41 The
Complaint at 7, Yuan (No. 3:18-cv-01725).
Lawrence J. Trautman, How Google Perceives Customer Privacy, Cyber, E-Commerce, Political and
Regulatory Compliance Risks, 10 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1, 12 (2018).
40
Id.
41
See Jonah Force Hill, The Growth of Data Localization Post-Snowden: Analysis and Recommendations
for U.S. Policymakers and Business Leaders, The Hague Inst. For Glob. Just. (2014).
38
39
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Panama Papers, 42 and Russian hacking of elections in the United States and
many other countries). 43
A particular exploit that often results from phishing is “carding;” described
by the FBI as, “criminal activities associated with stealing personal
identification information and financial information belonging to other
individuals—including the account information associated with credit cards,
bank cards, debit cards, or other access devices—and using that information to
obtain money, goods, or services without the victims’ authorization or
consent.” 44
III. THE PHISHING EXPLOIT
We assess Russian intelligence services will continue to develop
capabilities to provide Putin with options to use against the United
States, judging from past practice and current efforts. Immediately
after Election Day, we assess Russian intelligence began a
spearphishing campaign targeting US Government employees and
individuals associated with US think tanks and NGOs in national
security, defense, and foreign policy fields. This campaign could
provide material for future influence efforts as well as foreign
intelligence collection on the incoming administration’s goals and
plans.
—James Clapper
Director of National Intelligence
January 10, 2017 45

A. What is Phishing?
DHS’s Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency defines phishing
as, “a form of social engineering. . . . [which often] use email or malicious
42
See Lawrence J. Trautman, How Google Perceives Customer Privacy, Cyber, E-Commerce, Political
and Regulatory Compliance Risks, 10 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1, 12 (2018) (citing Lawrence J. Trautman,
Following the Money: Lessons from the “Panama Papers,” Part 1: Tip of the Iceberg, 121 PENN ST. L. REV.
807 (2017)).
43
See Lawrence J. Trautman, Impeachment, Donald Trump and the Attempted Extortion of Ukraine, 40
PACE L. REV. (2020); Lawrence J. Trautman, Presidential Impeachment: A Contemporary Analysis, 44 U.
DAYTON L. REV. 529 (2019).
44
Lawrence J. Trautman, Managing Cyberthreat, 33 SANTA CLARA HIGH TECH. L.J. 230, 245 (2017).
45
ODNI Statement on Declassified Intelligence Community Assessment of Russian Activities and
Intentions in Recent U.S. Elections: Hearing Before the S. Intel. Comm., 115th Cong. (2017) (statement of James
Clapper, Director of National Intelligence). See also OFF. DIR. NAT’L INTELL., BACKGROUND TO “ASSESSING
RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS IN RECENT US ELECTIONS”: THE ANALYTIC PROCESS AND CYBER
INCIDENT ATTRIBUTION (2017), https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/ICA_2017_01.pdf.
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websites to solicit personal information by posing as a trustworthy organization.
For example, an attacker may send email seemingly from a reputable credit card
company or financial institution that requests account information, often
suggesting that there is a problem.” 46 Then, “[w]hen users respond with the
requested information, attackers can use it to gain access to the accounts.” 47
Unfortunately:
Phishing attacks may also appear to come from other types of
organizations, such as charities. Attackers often take advantage of
current events and certain times of the year, such as:
• Natural disasters (e.g. Hurricane Katrina, Indonesian
tsunami);
• Epidemics and health scares (e.g., H1N1, COVID-19);
• Economic concerns (e.g., IRS scams);
• Major political elections; and
• Holidays. 48

Phishing can take many forms in an effort to deceive vulnerable users and
gain access to sensitive information. One of the most common forms that most
organizations and citizens are exposed to is phishing emails. Email attacks are
usually composed of generic greetings, urgent phrases and some links that users
are instructed to click on. 49 These emails are crafted in a way that appears to be
from prominent and reliable resources such as Human Resources, which places
users at a higher risk. Therefore, it is imperative for all online users to become
more educated about the patterns of phishing emails and common features. Users
are encouraged to disregard emails that ask for sensitive information such as
date of birth, social security number, bank account number, etc.
Through data mining, companies can predict what products and services the
user is most likely to purchase. If the user fails to check the web browser privacy
settings, these companies can gain access to their internet search patterns,
cookies, and email content from free email services. Users are encouraged to
reach out to their technology department when these emails start to percolate in
their inboxes.
In addition to alarming emails, phishing also takes place in many social
media platforms as it often resides on one of the most used online platforms. The
46
Security Tip (ST04-014), Avoiding Social Engineering and Phishing Attacks, CYBERSECURITY &
INFRASTRUCTURE SEC. AGENCY (Aug. 25, 2020), https://us-cert.cisa.gov/ncas/tips/ST04-014 (alteration in
original).
47
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
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pattern of phishing through social media accounts are still very similar to the
ones hackers use in emails. Hackers tend to send fake massages sourced from
the user’s friends’ list, where they ask for sensitive information including bank
accounts and financial matters. For users to dodge these phishing emails, they
should always recognize suspicious patterns and never respond or provide any
sensitive information through emails or texts. Another defense is available by
installing anti-malware and anti-virus software to strengthen account protection
and other data residing on a user’s computer. These steps will contribute to
flagging illegal hacking activities and preventing users from falling into such
traps.
Kenneth D. Nguyen, Heather Rosoff and Richard S. John write,
“Researchers are keenly aware that humans are the weakest link in the cyber
security chain.” 50 Although, “the security of any cyber infrastructure mostly
depends on the participation of users to practice self-protective information
security behavior. Nevertheless, getting users to participate in safe online
behavior is a significant challenge.” 51 As is reasonable, “studies have shown that
internet users are very concerned about the privacy and security of their
information, many users are willing to provide access to their private
information in exchange for financial gain and convenience.” 52 Nguyen, Rosoff
and John contend, “This suggests that even though information security is an
important priority, internet users are willing to make security compromises to
achieve other goals.” 53

50
Kenneth D. Nguyen, Heather Rosoff & Richard S. John, Valuing Information Security from a Phishing
Attack, 3 J. CYBERSECURITY 159 (2017) (citing Iván Arce, The Weakest Link Revisited [information security], 1
IEEE SEC. & PRIV. 72-76 (2003)); M.A. Sasse, S. Brostoff & D. Weirich, Transforming the ‘Weakest Link’ – A
Human/Computer Interaction Approach to Usable and Effective Security, 19 BT TECH. J. 122–31 (2001).
51
Nguyen, et al., supra note 50 (citing S.M. Furnell, A. Jusoh & D. Katsabas, The Challenges of
Understanding and Using Security: A Survey of End-Users, 25 COMPUTS. & SEC. 27 (2006)).
52
Id. (citing C. Papoutsi, J. Reed, C. Marston, R. Lewis, A. Majeed & D. Bell, Patient and Public Views
About the Security and Privacy of Electronic Health Records (EHRS) in the UK: Results from a Mixed Methods
Study, 15 BMC MED. INFORMATICS DECISION MAKING 86 (2015)); Oscar H. Gandy Jr., Public Opinion Surveys
and the Formation of Privacy Policy, 59 J. SOC. ISSUES 283 (2003); R. Gross & A. Acquisti, Information
Revelation and Privacy in Online Social Networks, in PROCEEDINGS OF 2005 ACM WORKSHOP ON PRIV. ELECT.
SOC., 71 WPES (2005); TrustArc 2016, 2016 TRUSTe/NCSA Consumer Privacy Infographic – GB Edition
(illustration); Mary Madden, Public Perceptions of Privacy and Security in the Post-Snowden Era, PEW
RESAERCH CTR (2014), https://www.pewresearch.org/internet/2014/11/12/public-privacy-perceptions/; Bob
Tedeschi, E-Commerce Report; Everybody Talks About Online Privacy, But Few Do Anything About It, N.Y.
TIMES, June 3, 2002, at C6; M. Glassman, M. Vandenwauver & L. Tam, The Psychology of Password
Management: A Tradeoff Between Security and Convenience, 29 BEHAV. & INFO. TECH. 233 (2010).
53
Id.
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Akamai warns, “phishing is a long-term, socially based problem, impacting
multiple market segments and people from all walks of life each day.” 54
Typically, “criminals use phishing to target the retail industry by masquerading
as popular brands and retail outlets. The individuals who fall for phishing scams
by submitting information, or those who inadvertently install malicious
applications, are the same people who contribute to a billion-dollar retail
economy worldwide.” 55 The SEC explains it this way:
When fraudsters go on “phishing” expeditions, they lure their
targets into a false sense of security by hijacking the familiar, trusted
logos of established, legitimate companies. A typical phishing scam
starts with a fraudster sending out millions of emails that appear to
come from a high-profile financial services provider or a respected
Internet auction house.
The email will usually ask you to provide valuable information
about yourself or to “verify” information that you previously provided
when you established your online account. To maximize the chances
that a recipient will respond, the fraudster might employ any or all of
the following tactics:
Names of Real Companies—Rather than create from scratch a
phony company, the fraudster might use a legitimate company’s
name and incorporate the look and feel of its website (including
the color scheme and graphics) into the phishy email.
“From” an Actual Employee—The “from” line or the text of the
message (or both) might contain the names of real people who
actually work for the company. That way, if you contacted the
company to confirm whether “Jane Doe” truly is “VP of Client
Services,” you’d get a positive response and feel assured.
URLs that “Look Right”—The email might include a
convenient link to a seemingly legitimate website where you can
enter the information the fraudster wants to steal. But in reality the
website will be a quickly cobbled copy-cat—a “spoofed” website
that looks for all the world like the real thing. In some cases, the
link might lead to select pages of a legitimate website—such as
the real company’s actual privacy policy or legal disclaimer.
Urgent Messages—Many fraudsters use fear to trigger a
response, and phishers are no different. In common phishing
scams, the emails warn that failure to respond will result in your
no longer having access to your account. Other emails might claim
that the company has detected suspicious activity in your account
or that it is implementing new privacy software or identity theft
solutions. 56
54
Phishing ̶ Baiting the Hook, 5 State of the Internet / Security, Akamai 1, 2 (2019), https://www.akamai.
com/fr/fr/multimedia/documents/state-of-the-internet/soti-security-phishing-baiting-the-hook-report-2019.pdf.
55
Id.
56
“Phishing” Fraud: How to Avoid Getting Fried by Phony Phishermen, U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N
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B. Spear Phishing
Sanchari Das et al. observe, “Spear phishing is the most common and
effective type of phishing, as it focuses on specific individuals, using personal
information about its victims. Spear phishing emails may address users by their
real name(s) or reference uniquely identifiable information obtained through
social engineering techniques.” 57 Das et al. warn:
Spear phishing is successful because attackers manipulate their targets,
either by luring users by promising them specific benefits or by
coercing users with specific threats. These manipulation techniques
often lead to impulsive or quick decision making from the end users.
One of the most common phishing motivations is the promise of
financial benefits to the intended victim. Gao et al. found that many
malicious websites attempt to attract users via money or product
offers. Attackers often attempt to have users click on their website to
earn a free product—such as an iPhone or video game system—or to
obtain job prospects, such as working online. 58

Inga Goddijn, Executive Vice President at RiskBased Security observes,
“The practice of targeting employee email accounts hit new heights in 2019. It
was a scenario that played out in a similar manner across different industries and
organizations of all sizes. Attackers used phishing emails or click bait to lure
users into giving up access to their email account.” 59 According to Ms. Goddijn,
“Once in, malicious actors were free to explore the content and contacts of the
account holder. These events can be time-consuming, resource-intensive
incidents to remediate. The breach at Children’s Hope Alliance (CHA)
illustrates just how challenging it can be to sort through the aftermath of this
type of intrusion.” 60 We have included the timeline for the Children’s Hope
Alliance (CHA) attack at Exhibit 4. In this one example, it took “134 days from
discovery to finally being able to alert those that may have had their data
accessed by attackers. Or in other words, Children’s Hope Alliance spent one
third of the year in response to 27 days of unauthorized access to emails.”
(Sept. 5, 2013), https://www.sec.gov/reportspubs/investor-publications/investorpubsphishinghtm.html. See also
Neal Newman & Lawrence J. Trautman, Securities Law: Overview and contemporary Issues, http://ssrn.com/
abstract=3790804; Lawrence J. Trautman, Seletha Butler, Frederick Chang, Michele Hooper, Ron McCray &
Ruth Simmons, Corporate Directors: Who They Are, What They Do, Cyber and Other Contemporary
Challenges, http://ssrn.com/abstract=3792382.
57
Sanchari Das, Andrew Kim, Zachary Tingle & Christena Nippert-Eng, All About Phishing Exploring
User Research Through a Systemic Literature Review, in Proceedings of the Thirteenth Int’l Symp. on Human
Aspects of Info. Sec. & Assurance (HA/SA 2019), http://ssrn.com/abstract=3438203.
58
Id. (internal citations omitted).
59
RISK BASED SECURITY, supra note 7.
60
Id.
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Exhibit 4
Timeline of Children’s Hope Alliance Incident61
April 23, 2019 – Unauthorized access to CHA email accounts begins;
May 15, 2019 – CHA became aware of suspicious activity on one
account and launches an investigation;
May 20, 2019 – All compromised accounts secured; work gets
underway on determining what information was contained in emails;
July 20, 2019 – CHA confirmed that compromised accounts held
sensitive data;
August 1, 2019 – CHA begins notifying business partners who may
have provided the sensitive data to Children’s Hope; a list of
potentially affected individuals is created, but it requires substantial
de-duplication and is missing addresses for notification;
September 10, 2019 – Contact list is clean and ready to use; [and]
September 26, 2019 – CHA begins mailing notification letters to
affected persons. 62

C. Barbarians at the Gate Array
Exhibit 5 presents a contemporary example of a successful fraudulent
phishing scheme that successfully resulted in more than $120 million being
funneled to bank accounts located in vast parts of the globe. 63 Evaldas
Rimasauskas was arrested in March 2017 for successfully targeting
multinational internet companies from the other side of the globe. Rimasauskas
targeted multinational internet companies and “tricked their agents and
employees into wiring over $100 million to overseas bank accounts under his
control.” 64 The acting U.S. Attorney, Joon H. Kim, stated, “This case should
serve as a wake-up call to all companies ̶ even the most sophisticated ̶ that they
too can be victims of phishing attacks by cyber criminals.” 65

61

Id.
Id. (alteration in original).
63
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Lithuanian Man Sentenced to 5 Years in Prison for Theft of over
$120 Million in Fraudulent Business Email Compromise Scheme (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usaosdny/pr/lithuanian-man-sentenced-5-years-prison-theft-over-120-million-fraudulent-business.
64
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Lithuanian Man Arrested for Theft of over $100 Million in
Fraudulent Email Compromise Scheme Against Multinational Internet Companies, (Mar. 21, 2017), https://
www.justice.gov/usao-sdny/pr/lithuanian-man-arrested-theft-over-100-million-fraudulent-email-compromisescheme.
65
Id.
62
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Exhibit 5
Lithuanian Man Sentenced to 5 Years in Prison for Theft of Over $120 Million
in Fraudulent Business Email Compromise Scheme 66

66
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Lithuanian Man Sentenced to 5 Years in Prison for Theft of over
$120 Million in Fraudulent Business Email Compromise Scheme (Dec. 19, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/usaosdny/pr/lithuanian-man-sentenced-5-years-prison-theft-over-120-million-fraudulent-business.
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D. Romanian Online Organized Crime Ring
In another case, the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) reported, “according
to court documents unsealed [on February 7, 2019], 20 people, including 16
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foreign nationals, have been charged for their roles in an international organized
crime group that defrauded American victims through online auction fraud
causing millions of dollars in losses.” 67 Assistant Attorney General
Benczkowski states, “the defendants allegedly orchestrated a highly organized
and sophisticated scheme to steal money from unsuspecting victims in America
and then launder their funds using cryptocurrency.” 68 In July 2018, a federal
grand jury sitting in Lexington, Kentucky charged 15 foreign nationals with
RICO conspiracy, wire fraud conspiracy, money laundering conspiracy, and
aggravated identity theft in a 24-count indictment. 69 Just a few months later, a
Lexington Kentucky grand jury, returned an 11-count indictment charging an
additional foreign national and four Americans for their roles in the criminal
enterprise. The DOJ reports:
The indictment alleges that these defendants participated in a criminal
conspiracy primarily located in Alexandria, Romania that engaged in
a large-scale scheme of online auction fraud. Specifically, Romaniabased members of the conspiracy and their associates posted false
advertisements to popular online auction and sales websites—such as
Craigslist and eBay—for high-cost goods (typically vehicles) that did
not actually exist. According to the indictment, these members would
convince American victims to send money for the advertised goods by
crafting persuasive narratives, for example, by impersonating a
military member who needed to sell the advertised item before
deployment. The members of the conspiracy are alleged to have
created fictitious online accounts to post these advertisements and
communicate with victims, often using the stolen identities of
Americans to do so. They are alleged to have delivered invoices to the
victims bearing trademarks of reputable companies in order to make
the transactions appear legitimate. Once victims were convinced to
send payment, the indictment alleges that the conspiracy engaged in a
complicated money laundering scheme wherein domestic associates
would accept victim funds, convert these funds to cryptocurrency, and
transfer proceeds in the form of cryptocurrency to foreign-based
associates. The indictment alleges that these foreign-based money
launderers . . . exchanged cryptocurrency into local fiat currency on

67
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., United States and International Law Enforcement Dismantle Online
Organized Crime Ring Operating out of Romania that Victimized Thousands of U.S. Residents (Feb. 7, 2019)
(alteration in original), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/united-states-and-international-law-enforcement-dismantle-onlineorganized-crime-ring.
68
Id. See also Lawrence J. Trautman, Virtual Currencies; Bitcoin & What Now After Liberty Reserve,
Silk Road, and Mt. Gox?, 20 RICH. J.L. & TECH. 13 (2014) (discussing the use of virtual currencies for money
laundering and payment from illicit activities).
69
U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 67.
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behalf of the Romania-based members of the conspiracy, knowing that
they were exchanging bitcoin that represented the proceeds of fraud. 70

The DOJ stated that, “[Defendant] Adrian Mitan, who was charged in the
July 5, 2018 indictment, was also charged in a separate indictment unsealed
[February 7, 2019] with money laundering offenses arising from a credit card
phishing and brute-force attack scheme, likewise designed to steal money from
Americans.” 71 As explained in the indictment, “phishing is an attempt to acquire
personal information by masquerading as a trustworthy entity through electronic
communications, and a brute force is a cryptological trial-and-error
methodology used to obtain information such as personal identification numbers
for credit cards.” 72 The DOJ reports:
[The defendant] allegedly phished for credit/debit card information of
U.S. customers, hacked into the electronic systems of American
businesses, and then conducted a brute force attack on their point-ofsale systems for the purpose of stealing the remaining credit/debit card
information. According to the indictment, [the defendant] then
directed American money launderers to create “dummy” credit/debit
cards with the stolen information, which were used to extract money
from the customers’ accounts. These fraudulent proceeds were then
returned to [the defendant] in the form of bitcoin. 73

While each defendant maintains a presumption of innocence until proven
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt in a court of law, the DOJ provides the
following discussion and analysis of potential sentencing ramifications if found
guilty:
For the RICO conspiracy and wire fraud conspiracy charges, each
defendant faces up to 20 years in prison, a fine of $250,000, and three
years of supervised release. The same penalties apply to the money
laundering conspiracy charges, except that the fine may be up to
$500,000. Additionally, if convicted of identity theft, Brown faces a
term of 15 years in prison, a fine of $250,000, and three years of
supervised release, and if convicted of aggravated identity theft, those
charged face a mandatory-minimum sentence of two years in prison,
to be served consecutive to any term of imprisonment ordered for the
70
Id. See also Lawrence J. Trautman & Alvin C. Harrell, Bitcoin Versus Regulated Payment Systems:
What Gives?, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 1041 (2017); Lawrence J. Trautman & Mason J. Molesky, A Primer for
Blockchain, 88 UMKC L. REV. 239 (2019); Lawrence J. Trautman, Is Disruptive Blockchain Technology the
Future of Financial Services?, 69 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 232 (2016) (discussing blockchain and virtual
currencies).
71
U.S. Dep’t of Just., supra note 67 (alteration in original).
72
Id.
73
Id. (alteration in original).
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other counts of conviction. However, any sentence following a
conviction would be imposed by the Court, after its consideration of
the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines and the federal statutes. 74

Next, we discuss another 2019 example of a transnational online criminal
enterprise employing phishing emails, the GozNym network.
E. GozNym Cyber-Criminal Network
On May 16, 2019, the DOJ announced that “A complex transnational
organized cybercrime network that used GozNym malware in an attempt to steal
an estimated $100 million from unsuspecting victims in the United States and
around the world has been dismantled as part of an international law
enforcement operation.” 75 According to the DOJ, “The spamming operations
involved the mass distribution of GozNym malware through ‘phishing’ emails.
The phishing emails were designed to appear legitimate to entice the victim
recipients into operating the emails and clicking on a malicious link or
attachment, which facilitated the downloading of GozNym onto the victims’
computers.” 76 In a cooperative effort by law enforcement agencies in Bulgaria,
Georgia, Germany, Moldova, Ukraine, along with Europol and Eurojust,
numerous criminal prosecutions have been brought. The DOJ reports, “GozNym
infected tens of thousands of victim computers worldwide, primarily in the
United States and Europe.” 77 According to the Indictment, the defendants
conspired to:
•
•
•

infect victims’ computers with GozNym malware designed to
capture victims’ online banking login credentials;
use the captured login credentials to fraudulently gain
unauthorized access to victims’ online bank accounts; and,
steal money from victims’ bank accounts and launder those
funds using U.S. and foreign beneficiary bank accounts
controlled by the defendants.

The defendants reside in Russia, Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova and
Bulgaria. The operation was an unprecedented international effort to
share evidence and initiate criminal prosecutions against members of
the same criminal network in multiple countries. . .

74

Id.
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., GozNym Cyber-Criminal Network Operating out of Europe
Targeting American Entities Dismantled in International Operation (May 16, 2019), https://www.justice.gov/
opa/pr/goznym-cyber-criminal-network-operating-out-europe-targeting-american-entities-dismantled.
76
Id.
77
Id.
75
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Five of the named defendants reside in Russia and remain
fugitives from justice. However, to overcome the inability to extradite
the remaining defendants to the United States for prosecution, an
unprecedented effort was undertaken to share evidence and build
prosecutions against defendants in the remaining countries where they
reside, including Georgia, Ukraine and Moldova. The prosecutions are
based on shared evidence acquired through coordinated searches for
evidence in Georgia, Ukraine, Moldova and Bulgaria, as well as from
evidence shared by the United States and Germany from their
respective investigations.
The GozNym network exemplified the concept of “cybercrime as
a service.” According to the Indictment, the defendants advertised
their specialized technical skills and services on underground,
Russian-language, online criminal forums. The GozNym network was
formed when these individuals were recruited from the online forums
and came together to use their specialized technical skills and services
in furtherance of the conspiracy. . .
Victims of the GozNym malware attacks include:
An asphalt and paving business located in New Castle,
Pennsylvania;
A law firm located in Washington, DC;
A church located in Southlake, Texas;
An association dedicated to providing recreation programs and
other services to persons with disabilities located in Downers
Grove, Illinois;
A distributor of neurosurgical and medical equipment
headquartered in Freiburg, Germany, with a U.S. subsidiary in
Cape Coral, Florida;
A furniture business located in Chula Vista, California;
A provider of electrical safety devices located in Cumberland,
Rhode Island;
A contracting business located in Warren, Michigan;
A casino located in Gulfport, Mississippi;
A stud farm located in Midway, Kentucky; and
A law office located in Wellesley, Massachusetts. 78

F. Common Indicators of Phishing Attempts
The CISA provides the following description about some of the common
indicators of phishing attempts:
•

78

Id.

Suspicious senders address. The sender’s address may
imitate a legitimate business. Cybercriminals often use an
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•

•

•

•

email address that closely resembles one from a reputable
company by altering or omitting a few characters.
Generic greetings and signature. Both a generic greeting—
such as “Dear Valued Customer” or “Sir/Ma’am”—and a
lack of contact information in the signature block are strong
indicators of a phishing email. A trusted organization will
normally address you by name and provide their contact
information.
Spoofed hyperlinks. If you hover your cursor over any links
in the body of the email, and the links do not match the text
that appears when hovering over them, the link may be
spoofed. Malicious websites may look identical to a
legitimate site, but the URL may use a variation in spelling
or a different domain (e.g., .com vs. .net). Additionally,
cybercriminals may use a URL shortening service to hide the
true destination of the link.
Spelling and layout. Poor grammar and sentence structure,
misspelling, and inconsistent formatting are other indicators
of a possible phishing attempt. Reputable institutions have
dedicated personnel that produce, verify, and proofread
customer correspondence.
Suspicious attachments. An unsolicited email requesting a
user download and open an attachment is a common delivery
mechanism for malware. A cybercriminal may use a false
sense of urgency or importance to help persuade a user to
download or open an attachment without examining it first. 79

G. Frauds Against Senior Citizens
Phishing emails targeting the elderly are among the greatest threats to online
information security for their ability to exploit the trust and naivety of senior
citizens. Studies shows that senior citizens fall prey to the breaches and attacks
because the bad actors consider the group as soft targets. 80 As much as we
understand that all age groups are equally vulnerable to on-line frauds, it can be
assumed that the elderly are more prone to these attacks. The reason might be
that most of the senior citizen group, retirees, widows, and lonely grandparents,
have their online data unprotected and are easily accessible by bad actors. 81
See Avoiding Social Engineering and Phishing Attacks, supra note 34.
Rui Zhao, Samantha John, Stacy Karas, Cara Bussell, Jennifer Roberts, Daniel Six, Brandon Gavett &
Chuan Yue, The Highly Insidious Extreme Phishing Attacks, in 25th International Conference on Computer
Communications and Networks (2016), https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/7568582; see also Ibrahim
Alseadoon, M.F.I. Othman & Taizan Chan, What Is the Influence of Users’ Characteristics on Their Ability to
Detect Phishing Emails?, in ADVANCED COMPUT. & COMMC’N ENG’G TECH. 949, 962 (2015).
81
See Stacey Wood, Benjamin Rakela, Pi-Ju Liu, Adria E. Navaro, Susan Bernatz, Kathleen H. Wilber,
79
80
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When the elderly are hacked through phishing and spear-phishing activities,
adverse financial and emotional loss often results.
The constantly changing accessibility of technology results in more
successful phishing attacks. 82 Most of the elderly are unwilling to use complex
passwords or learn how to strengthen them, perhaps because they feel it is too
much of a hassle to remember long and difficult passwords. Those age 65 and
older are more likely to report a tech scam, and less likely to report retail-related
scams, especially when financial loss is involved. 83 Senior citizens can be
exploited thru Man-in-the-middle / Man-in-the-Browser attack. This is a
technical network attack where the spoofed web site is a part of a man-in-themiddle / man-in-the browser attack. When seniors visit a site, they are redirected
to a false wireless access point or Domain Name System [DNS] posing as shown
in Exhibit 6.
Exhibit 6
Man-in-the-Middle Attack on Elderly-Senior Citizens 84

Robin Allen & Diana Homeier, Neuropsychological Profiles of Victims of Financial Elder Exploitation at the
Los Angeles County Elder Abuse Forensic Center, 26 J. ELDER ABUSE & NEGLECT 414 (2014).
82
Brandon E. Gavett, Rui Zhao, Samantha E. John, Cara A. Bussell, Jennifer R. Roberts & Chuan Yue,
Phishing Suspiciousness in Older and Younger Adults: The Role of Executive Functioning, 2017 PLoS ONE 1.
83
See Zhao et. al., supra note 80.
84
Phishing: A Primer on What Phishing is and How it Works, DIGICERT (2009), https://www.digicert.
com/news/DigiCert_Phishing_White_Paper.pdf.
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Research suggests that bad actors may target the elderly because they are
often naïve, inexperienced with computers, and potentially more willing to listen
to others. 85 Most of the attacks are conducted thru spear-phishing activities. 86 In
other situations, the bad actors attack the vulnerable senior citizen thru
fraudulent bank transfers. The bad actors accomplish this by picking disposed
deposit slips that were erroneously thrown away at the bank’s dustbin. The
elderly also leave acknowledgement slips around. This has been a potential gold
mine for the bad actors.
Exhibit 7
Example of a Phishing Home Page 87

Exhibit 7 illustrates a phishing generating homepage on the Amazon
phishing website that presents the same content that is displayed on a legitimate
Amazon website. 88 Another example of a Deep-Level Phishing Web Page is
presented as Exhibit 8. 89 These sites look real and are very deceiving to senior
citizens because they can be generated and presented to the elderly in real time.

85
86
87
88
89

See Gavett, et al., supra note 72.
See Das, et al., supra note 57 (defining spear-phishing).
Gavett, et al., supra note 82, fig.1.
Id.
See Gavett, et al., supra note 82, fig.2.

TRAUTMANETAL_4.13.21

2021]

4/15/2021 11:09 AM

POSTED: NO PHISHING

65

Exhibit 8
Another Example of a Phishing Home Page 90

H. Protecting Senior Citizens
Senior citizens can reduce the chance of falling victim to phishing attacks by
being sensitive and smart while browsing the net and checking their emails.
They should question and avoid unnecessary clicking on links, download files
or opening attachments in email or social media, even if it appears legitimate
from a known trusted source. Seniors should also be sensitive to emails
requesting confidential information such as personal information and banking
details. The Bad actors use “Fake” sites to steal personal data or perform a driveby-download attack. Hackers employ these drive-by-download attacks by
targeting unsuspecting networks or computers and downloading malicious codes
to such computers or networks. The bad actors compromise breached websites
and embed malicious elements inside the sites. Unsuspecting Senior citizens
while browsing a web page that has been infected can activate the exploit, which
happens in the background and without the user’s knowledge or consent.

90

Id.
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The FBI’s common scheme webpage reports that senior citizens are one of
the most likely groups in society to get hacked or scammed. 91 Formerly known
as the American Association of Retired Persons, the AARP reports that older
Americans are scammed out of billions of dollars each year. 92 Many senior
citizens who grew-up during the 1930s, 1940s, or 1950s were raised to trust
people. During that time, technology was not as abundant or ubiquitous as it is
now. Thus, many senior citizens are not properly and adequately trained to this
generation’s reliance on technology. Con artists are also attracted to seniors
because they often have near perfect credit scores.
Furthermore, when seniors are targeted, they are less likely to realize
quickly, nor report the theft accurately to officials. Con artists take advantage of
elders’ often poor health conditions, since these elderly victims are likely not
able to report fraud incidents or advocate for themselves passionately and
vigorously because, “Con artists know the effects of age on memory, and they
are counting on elderly victims not being able to supply enough detailed
information to investigators.” 93 The FBI’s website reports:
Older Americans are less likely to report a fraud because they don’t
know who to report it to, are too ashamed at having been scammed, or
don’t know they have been scammed. Elderly victims may not report
crimes, for example, because they are concerned that relatives may
think the victims no longer have the mental capacity to take care of
their own financial affairs. 94

Seniors should be aware of suspicious emails especially those with typos,
words in capital and exclamation marks. Examples are ‘Dear Customer’ or Dear
Sir/Madam’ salutations. Threats and urgent deadlines are suspicious and should
be investigated. Awareness to browse securely with HTTPs is very important.
This can be indicated by https:// and a security “lock” icon in the browser’s
address bar. Before sending credit information, ensure that the above protocol is
in the address bar. 95 The following are signs that a phishing attack is underway:
when an email has unofficial “From” address, when an urgent action is required,
when linked to a fake web site on a browser, and when the Web address looks
91
See Elder Fraud, FBI, https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-safety/common-scams-and-crimes/seniors (last
visited Jan. 5, 2021) [hereinafter Scams and Safety].
92
Katherine Skiba, Older Americans Hit Hard by Financial Fraud, AARP (Feb. 28, 2019), https://www.
aarp.org/money/scams-fraud/info-2019/cfpb-report-financial-elder-abuse.html.
93
Senior Citizens: Fraud Targets, NATIONAL CAREGIVERS LIBRARY, http://www.caregiverslibrary.org/
Featured/Consumer-Protection/Fraud-Target-Senior-Citizens (last visited Jan. 5, 2021) (citing Scams and
Safety, supra note 91).
94
See Scams and Safety, supra note 91.
95
See Wood, et al., supra note 81.
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suspicious. 96 Experts recommend preventing against phishing attacks by using
a web browser with anti-phishing detection. 97
IV. CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY FOR CORRECTIVE ACTION
Undoubtedly, the decision to notify law enforcement of a cyber-attack
and to cooperate fully in an investigation involves a certain riskreward calculation weighing the anticipated benefits of a pro-active
approach against potential legal, reputational, and other costs.
—Rod Rosenstein
Deputy Attorney General
October 30, 2017 98

A. Corporate Duties of Loyalty and Care
In a corporate setting, “officers and directors have two primary duties to
shareholders: a duty of loyalty (no self-dealing); and a duty of care (a duty to
behave reasonably). We now present a brief discussion of the corporate
director’s primary duties of loyalty and care.
B. Duty of Loyalty
In sum, the duty of loyalty, under Delaware law, requires, “that there shall
be no conflict between duty and self-interest.” 99 Breaches of the duty of loyalty
do not result per se from conflicts of interest. It is the manner in which directors
handle conflicts (full disclosure to the board, and solicitation of board
determination whether the conflict disqualifies the director from proceeding to
vote on related matters) that is required, “to ensure fairness to the corporation
and its stockholders that will determine the propriety of the director’s
conduct . . . .” 100

96
Mathias J. Klenk, Phishing Attack Prevention: Best 10 Ways to Prevent Email Phishing Attacks,
GBHACKERS (Sept. 9, 2019), https://gbhackers.com/phishing-attacks-prevention/.
97
Id.
98
Rod J. Rosenstein, Deputy Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Just., Remarks at the 2017 North American
International Cyber Summit (Oct. 30, 2017).
99
See Lawrence J. Trautman, Mohammed T. Hussein, Louis Ngamassi & Mason J. Molesky, Governance
of the Internet of Things (IoT), 60 JURIMETRICS 319 (2020) (citing Lawrence J. Trautman & Kara AltenbaumerPrice, The Board’s Responsibility for Information Technology Governance, 28 J. MARSHALL J. COMPUT. & INFO.
L. 313 (2011).
100
Id. (citing Byron Egan, Director Duties: Process and Proof, TEXASBARCLE WEBCAST: CORPORATE
MINUTES/DIRECTOR DUTIES (Oct. 23, 2008)).
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C. Duty of Care
One of your authors has observed elsewhere, every director’s legal duty of
care requires “a careful, diligent approach to the effective discharge of their
individual duties and responsibilities.” 101 In a corporate setting, phishing
exploits may be characterized as a foreseeable risk, potentially resulting in
catastrophic crisis for the organization. 102 Perceived by bad actors as easy
targets, recent examples of phishing exploits leading to data systems being held
hostage over ransomware demands have reached crisis levels for hospitals,
municipalities and educational institutions. 103 Fiduciary duties and the duty of
care are also applicable to the governance requirements of directors in a
nonprofit setting. 104 Effective corporate governance requires that the
Nominating and Governance Committees recruit directors who have experience,
and understand both information technology and matters related to cybersecurity
risk. 105 In addition, board audit committees are well advised to have cyber
expertise on the committee to enable better committee comprehension of cyber
vulnerabilities. 106 A good example of how corporate boards struggle to keep
pace with rapid technological change may be found in the experience of
PayPal. 107
D. Ormerod-Trautman Cybersecurity Model
Elsewhere Professors Ormerod and Trautman present a way to think about
the management of cybersecurity, The Profit-Maximizating Model of Security,
in Exhibit 9. 108

101
See Lawrence J. Trautman, The Board’s Responsibility for Crisis Governance, 13 HASTINGS BUS. L.J.
275, 282 (2017).
102
Id. at 287.
103
Trautman & Ormerod, supra note 37, at 510 (depicting numerous examples of ransomware attacks).
104
See Lawrence J. Trautman & Janet Ford, Nonprofit Governance: The Basics, 52 AKRON L. REV. 971
(2018).
105
Lawrence J. Trautman, The Matrix: The Board’s Responsibility for Director Selection and
Recruitment, 11 FLA. ST. U. BUS. REV. 75 (2012).
106
Lawrence J. Trautman, Who Qualifies as an Audit Committee Financial Expert Under SEC Regulations
and NYSE Rules?, 11 DEPAUL BUS. & COMM. L.J. 205 (2013).
107
Lawrence J. Trautman, E-Commerce, Cyber, and Electronic Payment System Risks: Lessons from
PayPal, 16 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 261 (2016); see also Lawrence J. Trautman, Bitcoin, Virtual Currencies, and
the Struggle of Law and Regulation to Keep Pace, 102 MARQ. L. REV. 447 (2018).
108
Lawrence J. Trautman & Janet Ford, supra note 104, at 1033.
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Exhibit 9
The Ormerod-Trautman Profit-Maximizing Model of Security 109

Note that at the leftmost point on the curve, enterprise data security is so
abysmal that few, if any, users trust the enterprise with their Personally
Identifiable Information (PII), therefore rendering the profitability or efficiency
of the enterprise’s data security function a nullity. To paraphrase, zero security
measures, as shown at the bottom left-hand side of the graph, result in zero users
and, therefore zero profitability (efficiency). But, as the enterprise security
improves an increasing number of users trust the enterprise with their PII, and
the risk of data breach and loss of users’ PII decreases, both of which contribute
to increased profitability (efficiency). At a point where the number of users is
maximized, increased security measures (spending on cybersecurity) result in
limiting the usability of the data/website and thus decrease profitability
(efficiency). Thus, taken to an extreme, excessive security measures may
theoretically drive usability to the point of futility, achieving no additional
benefit from the next dollar spent on cybersecurity and decreasing utility of
additional spend. For nonprofits, the Ormerod-Trautman Model can be
rephrased to illustrate the “cost-minimizing” level of security, as shown in
Exhibit 10. 110

109
110

Id.
Lawrence J. Trautman & Janet Ford, supra note 104, at 1034.
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Exhibit 10
Ormerod-Trautman
Cost-Minimizing Model of Security

Cost

Cost-Minimizing Model of Security

Security

On the left, as Professor Ormerod explains, “[C]yber services are costly due
to the threat of litigation and penalties; on the right, cyber services are costly
because they are prohibitively difficult to use and cost money to generate / host.
This re-conception allows nonprofits and governments to express security within
the confines of a dollar amount.” 111 The critical takeaway is that little or no
digital security may be just as damaging to an enterprise’s financial health as
implementing overly excessive security. Professors Trautman and Ormerod
further observe:
As this area of the law develops and matures in the coming years,
courts, regulators, shareholders, and commentators will increasingly
view the relationship between data security and [enterprise efficiency]
as described in [Exhibits 5 and 6 herein]. Perhaps the most important
implication of embracing the relationship depicted in the [OrmerodTrautman model] is that there is a profit-maximization [or cost
effective] amount of security. And, as this view of the relationship
between security and profitability is embraced, there can be little doubt
111

Id.
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that the various constituencies of stakeholders will increasingly expect
corporate officers and directors to actively seek their company’s
profit-maximizing level of data security. 112

V. PROTECTING YOURSELF FROM PHISHING
How can you best protect yourself from fraudulent and phony phishers? The
SEC suggests that the best approach “is to understand what legitimate financial
service providers and respectable online auction houses will and will not do.
Most importantly, legitimate entities will not ask you to provide or verify
sensitive information through a non-secure means, such as email.” 113
A. Recommended Action Steps
Here is a list of five simple steps that individuals can take to protect against
phishing exploits. Organizations should seek to educate all their employees to
the dangers posed by this problem. Accordingly, the SEC recommends:
1.

2.

3.

4.

112
113

Pick Up the Phone to Verify—Do not respond to any emails
that request personal or financial information, especially ones
that use pressure tactics or prey on fear. If you have reason to
believe that a financial institution actually does need personal
information from you, pick up the phone and call the
company yourself—using the number in your rolodex, not the
one the email provides!
Do Your Own Typing—Rather than merely clicking on the
link provided in the email, type the URL into your web
browser yourself (or use a bookmark you previously created).
Even though a URL in an email may look like the real deal,
fraudsters can mask the true destination.
Beef Up Your Security—Personal firewalls and security
software packages (with anti-virus, anti-spam, and spyware
detection features) are a must-have for those who engage in
online financial transactions. Make sure your computer has
the latest security patches, and make sure that you conduct
your financial transactions only on a secure web page using
encryption. You can tell if a page is secure in a couple of
ways. Look for a closed padlock in the status bar and see that
the URL starts with “https” instead of just “http.”
Read Your Statements—Don’t toss aside your monthly
account statements! Read them thoroughly as soon as they
arrive to make sure that all transactions shown are ones that

Lawrence J. Trautman & Janet Ford, supra note 104, at 1034–35.
See “Phishing,” supra note 1.
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5.

you actually made, and check to see whether all of the
transactions that you thought you made appear as well. Be
sure that the company has current contact information for
you, including your mailing address and email address.
Spot the Sharks—Visit the website of the Anti-Phishing
Working Group at www.antiphishing.org for a list of current
phishing attacks and the latest news in the fight to prevent
phishing. There you’ll find more information about phishing
and links to helpful resources. 114

The SEC recommends that you “always act quickly when you come face to
face with a potential fraud, especially when if you’ve lost money or believe your
identity has been stolen.” 115 In particular:
•

•

•

Phishy Emails—If a phishing scam rolls into your email box,
be sure to tell the company right away. You can also report
the scam to the FBI’s Internet Fraud Complaint Center at
www.ic3.gov. If the email purports to come from the
Securities and Exchange Commission, alert the SEC by
submitting a tip online at https://denebleo.sec.gov/TCRExter
nal/disclaimer.xhtml.
Identity Theft—If you think that your personal information
has been stolen, visit the Federal Trade Commission’s feature
on Identity Theft at www.consumer.ftc.gov/features/feature0014-identity-theft for information on how to control the
damage.
Securities Scams—Before you do business with any
investment-related firm or individual, do your own
independent research to check out their background and
confirm whether they are legitimate. For step-by-step tips and
links to helpful websites, please read Check Out Brokers and
Advisers and SIPC Exposes Phony “Look-Alike” Web Site.
Report investment-related scams to the SEC using our online
Complaint Center. 116

B. Ease of Usernames and Passwords Access
While on the subject of organizational and self-protection of access
credentials, we believe that all should learn lessons from the following valuable
insights. While observing that the top data types compromised are email
addresses, usernames and passwords, RiskBased Security discusses the
114
115
116

Id.
Id.
Id.
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September 12, 2019 disclosure, “that Zynga, the company behind Words with
Friends had been hacked. The attack exposed data on millions of players
including names, phone numbers and login information. Much had been said and
written about the need to strengthen passwords in recent years.” 117 What did the
Zynga data reveal? Unfortunately, as disclosed in Exhibit 11, an analysis of the
breach’s top 10 passwords:
shows that there has been very little movement away from weak, easy
to guess passwords. In fact, ‘password’ came in at the top spot,
followed by ubiquitous number sequences. The presence of ‘words’ in
the #6 spot is disheartening. Not only is it a weak choice, it is taken
directly from the name of the service. 118

Exhibit 11
Top 10 Passwords in the Zynga Breach 119

117
118
119

See RISK BASED SECURITY, supra note 7.
Id.
Id.
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CONCLUSION
Phishing has become a rising phenomenon in the current era, especially with
the advent of modern technology. It can take many forms such as suspicious
links and fraudulent emails that potentially lead to theft of valuable personal
information such as bank accounts, social security, and important passwords
used to access personal items. It is rather alarming that reviewed literature
reveals a lack of attention to the prominent threat of phishing attacks. Hence,
some steps have been recommended to prevent the exploits of phishing attacks,
such as identity verification, increasing security, and thoroughly reading
statements. It is the goal of this review to shed some light on the threat of
phishing attacks and grant it some of the attention that it deserves.
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